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Abstract
This article explores the themes of precarity and precarization by looking at
specific historical conjunctures in  the recent history of  Portuguese capitalist
development, relevant because of their enduring influence in shaping the
mutual constitution of state-led projects of accumulation and development,
dominant waged regimes and emergent normative livelihood models and
projects. The broader aim is to locate and understand precarization as an
ongoing process limiting the options and conditions of ‘wage earning’, and
the kin-based, classed and generational structures of feeling through which
ordinary people imagine and aspire to be ‘livelihood earners’. It is argued
that addressing the dialectic between being a wage earner and a livelihood
earner is absolutely central to a deeper understanding of precarization and its
multiple manifestations.
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Introduction
In recent decades the words precarity, precariousness and precariat have
increasingly shaped debates on the neoliberal conditions of labour
(de)regulation, within and outside academia, and on  both sides of  the
Atlantic. Two main bodies of  work have significantly contributed to the
academic and public diffusion of the concept: the works of Italian
autonomist Marxists (e.g. Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Virno 1996;
Lazzarato 1996), and those of the economist Guy Standing (2011). These
two bodies of scholarship tend to converge regarding the need to move
away from historical materialist terminologies, considered to be insufficient
to explain new forms of labour exploitation, emerging regimes of value
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creation and classed-defined political subjects. Also, both bodies of work
partake of a set of developments concerning the primary causes pervading
the emergence of precarity and precarization. Specifically, both bodies of
scholarship are underpinned by a dualist opposition between the Fordist-
Keynesian legacy of stable, protected, organised forms of labour, and the
contemporary spread and diffusion of  irregular, unprotected and
disorganised forms. The emergence of precarity dates from the 1970s and
1980s, following the globalisation of production, increased labour market
flexibility and class fragmentation.
The neoliberal explanatory narrative for the emergence of precarity tends
to privilege the  abstract and totalizing properties of  capitalist dynamics as
engines of  social change, with the consequent overestimation of ‘global’
forces, to the detriment of ‘local’ and contingent configurations arising
from historicized institutions and contingent factors shaping human
agency.2
 
In this article, I argue that the above assumptions illustrate relevant
misconceptions pervading the literature; in that, they tend to convey a
typological, ahistorical and unidimen- sional notion of precarity and
precarization. I argue that such misconceptions limit and compromise the
analytical, comparative and critical capabilities of the precarity terminology
and conceptual vocabulary.
In this article I explore how, in the Portuguese experience, throughout the
twentieth and twenty- first centuries, precarization has been an integral part
of state projects of accumulation and development, aiming to facilitate the
accommodation of external requirements of incorporation in broader
capitalist patterns. The state has mobilised collective common sense world-
views and grammars of identity (e.g. necessity, freedom, modernity, sacrifice)
as ideological instruments of political legitimation whilst incorporating
people’s livelihood projects into shifting regimes of accumulation. Intra-
generational livelihood projects towards middle-class distinction have
2 This article is based on two blocks of ethnographic fieldwork in Portugal. The first, between 2008 and
2009, in Lisbon, among young precarious call centre operators working in a private telecommunications
company (Matos 2010). The second, during 2015 and 2016, in Setúbal, a post-industrial city located 50
km south of Portugal’s capital city, undergoing the ongoing effects of austerity policies. This latter
research was developed within the context of the ERC-funded Grassroots Economics project, based at
the University of Barcelona, coordinated by Susana Narotzky. For more information please see
h  t tp:  / /www.ub.edu  / grass  r  ootseconom  ic  s  / .  
stabilised exploitative processes tied to the structural continuities of labour
precarization through its dislocation across time and structures of feeling. In a
national context shaped by a strong social memory of cumulative layers of
inequality and dispossession, people’s orientation towards the future and
across generations has constituted perhaps the most realistic way of making
the present bearable, whilst envisioning alternative livelihood horizons. In
Portugal, people’s longing for a better livelihood for themselves and the next
generation expresses the power exerted by hegemonic state projects of
accumulation and regulation as well as their unfinished and contested
character, across temporalities and scales (Smith 1999).
In what follows  I thus address the themes of precarity and precarization by
looking at specific historical ‘critical junctions’ (Kalb and Tak 2006) in the
recent history of Portuguese capitalist development, relevant because of their
enduring influence in shaping the mutual constitution of state-led projects of
accumulation and development, dominant waged regimes and emergent
normative livelihood models and projects3
 
These include the dictatorship of
Estado Novo (New State, 1933–1974), the Carnation revolution (25 April
1974), the joining of the European Eco- nomic Community (EEC) in 1986
and the recent austerity structural adjustment (2011–2014). I focus particularly
on unravelling how precarization has been deployed by the state as an integral
part of national projects of accumulation and development and the
accommodation of global capitalist imperatives, even if embedded in distinct
moral and ideological frameworks of legitima- tion. I further explore how the
former have shaped the way livelihood projects are imagined and enacted by
ordinary people, along the lines of kinship, class and generation. The broader
aim is to locate and understand precarization as an ongoing process limiting the
options and conditions of ‘wage-earning’, and the kin-based, classed and
generational structures of feeling (Williams 1977) through which ordinary
people imagine and aspire to be ‘livelihood earners’. I argue that
addressing the dialectic between being a wage earner and a livelihood earner is
central to a deeper understanding  of precarization and its  multiple
3Some of the critiques of the precarity terminology and the concept of the precariat include Federeci
(2008), Munck (2013), Breman (2013) and Palmer (2014).
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manifestations.
The aim of this article is not to suggest that the association between the
neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist economy  and the ascendency of
precarity is analytically incorrect but rather to argue that privileging this view
may lead us to underestimate the role played by particular state economies in
facilitating or preventing broader developments. As acutely pointed out by
Roseberry (2002), Bcapitalist accumulation processes are instituted and
organised through particular social and political
structures, which are not uniform throughout history^. One of the weaknesses
in the mainstream literature on precarity is precisely the fact that it tends to
underestimate the importance of local
context. Moreover, it does not explain the institutional, regulatory and legal
pre-existing conditions that may facilitate or prevent the emergence or
continuation of processes of precarization. Locating the development,
emergence or reconfiguration of precarization processes at a ‘local’ scale does
not mean downplaying the systemic and structural features of accumulation.
Rather, it means asserting that capital accumulation does not occur in a
vacuum; it needs to be instituted, organised and more importantly, made
acceptable. One of the ways regimes of accumulation are made acceptable is
through its embeddedness in normative livelihood models and projects,
linked to particular configurations of kin, class and generation.
The remaining of this article is structured as follows. In the next section,
I address how the dictatorship of Estado Novo (1926–1974) promoted a
protectionist and nationalist strategy of development grounded on systemic
practices of labour devaluation and repression, ideologically anchored on the
moralization of necessity and the myth of the ‘natural rural and poor
country’. It is in this historical landscape that the working-class parental
generations of today’s precarious workers articulated a sense of hope by
investing in the expectations of upward social mobility and middle- class
status—through stable employment and educational achievement—for the
next generation. After I explore how the national project of economic and
social freedom underpinning the socialist- oriented Carnation revolution of
1974 was curtailed by the intensification of endemic fragilities of the
Portuguese economy in a global context of international crisis and ascendency
of flexible capitalism. I illustrate the emergent disconnect between
aspirations of protected and stable employment and emergent forms of
flexible labour by looking at generational discontinuities vis-à-vis work, family
and class aspirations. This is followed by an examination of how the state
framed adhesion to the EEC in 1986 as a national project of  modernity,
which enabled the reconciliation of the increasing neoliberal reconfiguration of
the economy and the  expansion of welfare protections,  social  security and
mass higher education. The neoliberal embedded promise of modernity
intensified the lived contradiction between increasing forms of labour
precarization and growing expectations of work security, status and
recognition amongst younger generations. In the final section before the
conclusion, I examine how during the recent austerity adjustment
programme implemented in Portugal (2011–2014) the state mobilised the
morality of sacrifice across generations as a way of seeking legitimation for
the continuation of policy measures of labour precarization.
The reality of necessity and the articulation of hope
In 1994, students demonstrating against restrictions on access to higher
education in Portugal were stigmatised as ‘Geração Rasca’ (Troubled
Generation). This aroused some controversy, but  it served the purpose of
typecasting younger generations as amoral, apolitical and unethical. In 2008
the ‘Troubled Generation’ was renamed ‘Geração 500 euros’ (The 500 euros
generation), encompassing overqualified young people aged around 30,
employed in insecure work, and said to constitute at the time 28% of the
active population. In March 2011, after the government’s public
announcement of upcoming austerity, the Troubled Generation emerged from
an apparent silence and resignation. A group of young people called for a
public demonstration through social media networks, presenting themselves
as ‘non-partisan, secular and pacifists’ and asking for people to demonstrate
for improved working conditions, and an end to ‘employment precarity’. The
protest, one of the biggest since 1974, took place in 11 cities and became
known as the social movement of the ‘Geração à Rasca’ (Generation in
Trouble).
In Portugal, from the late 1990s to the present day, the meaning of precarity,
as deployed by politicians, the media and people generally, is prominently
associated with the failure of intra- generational projects of middle-class
distinction and upward social mobility, based on stable employment and
higher education achievement. These projects and models of class are
profoundly and intimately embedded in a history of state-led projects of
accumulation throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, enabled by
patterns of labour devaluation, and ideologically  conveyed as national
projects of freedom, modernity or collective progress. Portugal’s emergence in
the twentieth century as a member of the European Union was shaped by
specific features, including more than 40 years under fascist rule. The Estado
Novo (1933–1974) regime was a dictatorship that promoted a protectionist
and nationalist strategy of economic development. This implied suppressing
labour channels of dissent through a corporatist structure and sustaining
patterns of extreme labour exploitation, whilst simultaneously assuming a
paternalistic position vis-à-vis labour in order to contain the ‘excesses’ of a
free-market economy. They could potentially disrupt the image of Portugal as
an ‘essentially rural country’, ‘poor but honoured and honest’.
 
4These two
facets of Portuguese corporatism (repression and  paternalism) vis-à-vis labour
were determinant in sustaining the stability of a regime in which the majority
of the population lacked not only essential civil liberties such as access to
education, speech and freedom but also suffered cultural repression and
censorship and harsh life conditions, shaped by chronic malnutrition  and
4 Images cherished by the regime and its allied classes (e.g. the conservative rural oligarchy), broadly
deployed by the ministry of propaganda.
hunger.5
 
From the 1930s until the 1950s, the principles described above
reinforced the maintenance of a ‘dual society’ (Nunes 1964). The vast
majority of the population was employed in a
 
stagnant agricultural sector,
whilst a small minority lived in coastal cities, working in a poorly developed
industrial sector. Such duality coexisted with a strong ‘homogeneous and
non- plural’ (Martins 1998) society marked by a high degree of ethnic,
linguistic and cultural cohesiveness and a rigid class system in which a
small upper class maintained strong links with the political elite through the
institutions (i.e. the  military and the universities) necessary for their
reproduction.6
 
With post-Second World War economic expansion, the regime
drove a renewed impetus towards industrialisation, progressive market
liberalisation and opening of the country to foreign capital.7
 
The rural
exodus to the coastal cities and increased job opportunities in the
industrial and service sectors led to shifts in the distribution of the
labouring population, as well as in lifestyles, modes of conviviality and habits
of consumption (Rosas 1998).
The Estado Novo instituted a regime in which the myth of the ‘natural
rural country’ provided a moral framework legitimising the social status
quo, maintaining a deeply rigid class system and ensuring a ‘model of
5 The corporatist dictatorship of Estado Novo put an end to the First Republic (1910–1926) and the timid
gains, in terms of rights, entitlements and expectations, accomplished for the working classes. During
the First Republic, in spite of a high degree of political instability and divisions inside the Partido
Republicano Português (Portuguese Republican Party), important welfare, educational and agrarian
reforms projects were on the parliamentary agenda. Nonetheless, relevant groupings on the left
representing worker’s interests grew further apart from the mainstream politics of bourgeois
compromise (Chilcote 2010). Some of the former groupings included the national workers’ union—the
União Operária Nacional—founded in 1913, which, under anarchist control, changed its name to the
Confederação Geral do Trabalho (General Confederation of Labor (CGT)) in 1919, reaching 120,000
members, and the Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)) founded in 1921.
These left groupings contributed to a period of high labour agitation, pressuring for left reforms to be
carried out, that led to 518 strikes during the First Republic in contrast to 91 during the last decade of
monarchy. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the internal and external factors that facilitated the
advent of fascism in Portugal—a theme of great controversy among Portuguese historians. This
background information is meant to underline the non-neglectable importance of the corporatist legacy
in shaping generational discon- tinuities in horizons of expectations vis-à-vis work, rights  and
entitlements, as will become clearer further ahead in this article.
6 In 1911, 75.1% of the population was illiterate, 69.3% in 1940, 48.7% in 1950 and in 1960 40.3%
were still illiterate. That is, in 1940 Portugal had the level of illiteracy that Spain had in 1900, and in
1950 the same Italy had in 1910 (Carreira 1996, p. 436).
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Portugal joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959 and in 1972 signed a
commercial agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC).
semi-proletarianization’ (Cabral 1979, p. 161; Van Der Linden 2008)
bounding the production and reproduction realms. The corporatist illusion
of social harmony was mirrored in the praise of the hierarchical and
patriarchal family as the social unit responsible for care-taking, social
assistance and charity. Nonetheless, if the family was the material structure
and abstraction that favoured a deeply unequal system for the allocation
of societal resources (Pimentel 2011), it was also the affective and meaning-
making structure, underpinned by interdependent obligations and
responsibilities, through which intra- generational livelihood improvement
projects were articulated and enacted.8
In a highly unequal and repressive  society, the working  class older
generations9
 
combined the available Fordist-like employment opportunities
(in services or industrial work) with informal networks of resources,
whilst engaging with the status-laden consumption choices of an expanding
market. Older generations mobilised the available social and historical forms
to act upon necessity in the present, and articulate a horizon of hope for the
future (Narotzky and Besnier 2014). The production of a sense of future
was embedded in configurations of kin, class and generation, and hopes of
upward class mobility, based on stable employment and educational
achievement. For those whose early lives had been shaped by necessity and
the realisation  of  ‘knowing one’s place’ (Bourdieu 2000, p.  184), the
emerging model of  middle- class distinction presented itself as an avenue
to prosperity, but also as a morality of social worth, status and productive
incorporation in the nation. That is, the reality of necessity in the present
was tied to the articulation of hope in and of the future, deferring
expectations of a better life to the next generation.
During the 1950s and 1960s, state-led policies aimed at encouraging the
growth of the industrial sector, took place against the backdrop of internal
8Feminist approaches to the economy stress the porous and tension connections between public and
private, economic and familial, production and reproduction (Yanagisako 2012; Bear et al. 2015).
For instance, Yanagisako (2002), shows how in the Italian Como silk industrial sector the expansion of
entrepreneurial activity and the opening of new firms was intimately linked to gendered, familial and
generational livelihood projects centred on the ideas of masculine autonomy, freedom and
independence.
9 Throughout this article, parental generations encompass those born between 1940 and 1960; most of
whom with 4 to 7 years of certified schooling; and a rural-urban internal migratory experience. Young
generations of precarious workers are broadly those born after 1974.
tensions between the advocates of industrialisation and rural conservative
forces and pronounced regional asymmetries, between the dynamic
industrial south—with high levels of proletarianisation—and the
traditional north—with a greater concentration of traditional types of
industry with lower wages. The ‘golden age’ of capitalism (Hobsbawn
1994), as expressed in the Portuguese economy, was significant but
conditioned by several internal vulnerabilities. The unsuccessful constitution
of the ‘Portuguese common market’; the colonial war (1961–1975);
increases in wages and stability of employment in coastal cities, partly
motivated by high levels of emigration and military mobilisation; and
structural disequilibrium resulted in the stagnation of the agricultural sector
and the favouring of traditional exports strongly dependent on cheap
labour (Rosas 1998, p. 100).
As noted by Rofel (1999), in contexts where the development of modernity
did not follow a Euro-centric  and American route, a ‘deferred relationship
with modernity’ shapes the ways in which  forms of domination and
exclusion are enacted in the name of modernity, and also the moral
struggles pursued with  and through generations towards a  sustaining and
fulfilling life. The regime of Estado Novo enforced a national tradition of
labour devaluation, shaping the groundwork for later patterns of
precarization, and it was the background of, and against which, the
parental  generations of today’s young precarious workers articulated their
hopes of a better life across generations, and their most intimate
aspirations of economic and social freedom, particularly shaped by the
Carnation Revolution of 1974.
Envisioning freedom: “April is still to be accomplished”
The Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 ended the dictatorship. It is
inscribed in the national memory as the foundational moment of
Portuguese democracy, enabling the legal codification of emancipatory
rights and citizenship entitlements. However, amongst critical Portuguese
leftists in their 60s and 70s, the expression ‘Falta cumprir April’ (April is still
to be accomplished) indicates the contradictions and tensions underpinning
the revolutionary con- juncture and its aftermath.
Portugal’s uneven integration in wider capitalism is shaped by the peripheral
nature of its economy, and by the external requirements of alignment with
globalising trends and the ascendency of flexible patterns of accumulation
and labour mobilisation, deployment and governance (Harvey 1989). The
disconnect between the socialist goals of Portugal’s revolutionary process
and external neoliberalism intensifies endemic fragilities in the economy.
Such fragilities are externally stabilised through the adoption of free-
market policies, eminently represented by the continuation of patterns of
labour devaluation and internally legitimised through a morally embedded
national project of social and economic freedom, mirroring the aspirations of
the majority of the population.
The revolutionary movement’s ultimate goal of greater social justice and
equality contrib- uted to shifts which, if only briefly, changed the
traditional relations between capital and labour. In 1975, the national
minimum wage was codified in law and the right to strike legalised.
Social security benefits for sickness and the right to paid holidays
were universalised, general access to education and health was achieved
and freedom of speech and the press was consecrated in the constitution. In
March 1975, following a failed coup, the bank and insurance sectors were
nationalised. Up until July 1976 more than 240 firms were under state
control. In 1976, the new constitution of the Portuguese Republic emphasised
the need to move towards a society without classes, with the aim of ensuring
a transition to socialism, and the collective appropriation of the means of
production and land, as well as natural resources and the democratic exercise
of the power of the working classes.10
 
In the first revision of the constitution in
1982 this last article was changed to satisfy the requirements of the European
Economic Community (EEC), which Portugal had requested to join in 1977.
During the government of 1976–1978, the idea that the country should free
itself from erstwhile ‘economic protectionism’ gathered a consensus amongst
political forces, in particular regarding the necessity of making labour
relations more flexible to accommodate the devel- opment of market
mechanisms. This was made manifest in changes in labour law and union
10 Please see h  t tp  :/  /www.p  arla  mento.pt  / Leg  i s  la  cao/pag  i nas  /c  ons  tit  u  i cao  r  epub  li  capo  rt  uguesa.aspx  .  
representation. Namely, the introduction of the legal entity of the short-term
contract of work and the annulment of the Lei de Unicidade Sindical (Law of
Trade Union Unity) enacted after the revolution, shaped by the influence of
the Partido Comunista Português, guaranteeing that the Intersindical11
 
had a
monopoly of union representation.
Whilst the above shifts are expressive of broader neoliberal labour
deregulation patterns, in Portugal they coexisted with contra-cyclical social
and political measures which expanded Fordist forms of stable and protected
employment, the legal codification of social entitlements and the
development of state welfare provisioning structures and services. That
is, the expansion of stable employment across various economic sectors was
politically determined by a strong state intervention, in which the defence of
workers’  rights was emphasised in the name of  the transition to a socialist
society, and not as a defence of the introduction of some form of reformed
capitalism (Santos et al. 1990, pp. 175–176).12
 
In Portugal, the historical
simultaneity of state-led projects accommodating neoliberal patterns of
accumulation and socialist regulatory labour patterns facilitated the
coordination of different forms of mobilising social labour for accumulation
purposes, whilst also shaping livelihood strategies, investments and projects.
Throughout the  1980s, individuals’ strategies  for  survival in the face  of
national and international recession combined traditional forms of
subsistence and strategies of con- sumption (i.e. pequena agricultura
familiar—small-family agricultural production), informal labour activities
and the resilience of a ‘welfare society’13, which mitigated the deficiencies of
11The predecessor of the present Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP—
General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers), created in 1970 and organically linked to the
Portuguese Communist Party.
12 In a comparative perspective, in Portugal, the tensions between socialist aims and emergent
neoliberal apitalism, during the late 1970s and 1980s, are more shaped by the contested legacy of the
revolutionary process (1974–1976) among political forces and the IMF intervention in the country in
1977 and in 1983, which resulted in further flexibilisation of labour laws, than by revisionist trends of
the European left (i.e. Eurocom- munism). The Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist
Party (PCP)) did not condemn the Prague Spring of 1968 and maintained itself aligned with the Soviet
Union up until 1989.  In the 1990s the PCP will go through a serious internal crisis in which many
members abandon the party, but will again  assert in  congress its ‘Marxist and Leninist matrix’,
organizationally based upon democratic centralism. PCP maintains a fixed electoral support
(between 8 and 9%), due to its role as the major opposition party during the dictatorship, particularly
in the southern rural areas of the country.
13
 
Santos et al. (1990) defines ‘welfare society’ as the networks of relationships of inter-knowledge,
mutual  recognition and mutual help based on kinship and community ties,  through which small social
a late-developing and inefficient welfare state.
Sara’s (1957) trajectory illustrates how the above disjuncture (between the
expansion of stable forms of employment and emergent neoliberalism) was
articulated and stabilised by ordinary people  through particular livelihood
investments and  strategies  cutting-cross the realms of class, kin and
generation. Sara’s parents were landless rural workers who migrated from
Algarve to Setúbal when she was 9; ‘they came here because they wanted
a better life’. The father was illiterate, and the mother studied until the
third grade of primary school. With the help of friendship and kin
networks, the father began working in construction, and the mother engaged
in various forms of homework. Sara’s parents enabled her to complete
secondary education in the local technical school; ‘I was the only one in the
family studying that much’. Sara undertook casual work in the grape harvest
before getting her first full-time job in 1977 working on the assembly line of
an electronics factory.  After  3 years she transferred to administrative  work.
She saved for her marriage; ‘my parents never asked me for money to help
the household’. Until 1981 Sara lived with her parents and used her monthly
income to buy kitchen appliances for her future home.  She also  saved,
together  with  a small loan from her parents, to  raise a mortgage with her
future husband. In 1991 the factory outsourced to Malaysia. From 1977 until
1991, with a well- paid and socially protected job, Sara was able to establish
a family, complete the payments on the family flat and invest strategically in
the education and well-being of her son, born in 1983, and her daughter,
born in 1988. After being made redundant from the factory in 1991, she was
entitled to unemployment benefits for 18 months. In 1993 she was relocated
to another electronics factory, where she is still working today.
Sara valued the way she and her husband were able to save, control their
finances, buy their own house, take pride in their work and invest in their
children’s education. In the same way that their parents never asked her to
help with money in the  household expenses,  she and her husband did the
same with their children. They did so with the primary aim that ‘they would
have better life chances’. This happened with her daughter, Amalia, born in
groups exchange goods and services. Interestingly, the ways in which the Portuguese welfare society
facilitated the development and expansion of labour neoliberalisation processes in the 1970s and
1980s anticipated the political and ideological visions entailed for the ‘Big Society’ by the
Conservative-Liberal democrat coalition government in the UK (2010–2015).
1988. Amalia, in contrast to her grandparents and parents, went to university
and in 2010 to London to study an MA in Interior design, being fully
supported by her parents. After finishing the master’s course, Amalia has
had several low-paid jobs in service work, such as retailing and
waitressing. After her child was born, she returned to Portugal in 2015.
She was unable to support herself together with her partner, but in
Portugal could have the financial and emotional support of her parents.
Through her mother, Amalia was able to find a temporary position as a
receptionist in a dental clinic, and rents a flat near her parents, who go daily
to pick up her daughter at the nursery and provide for her daily meals.
For Sara, finding her daughter unable to achieve independent adulthood
and upward mobility and a stable job that fits her qualifications is a source
of frustration, disappointment and indignity. That is, the argument many
times alluded to by Sara to justify her parents’ internal migration and to
justify her investment in her daughter’s education was that of
accomplishing a ‘better life’. In both cases, the notion of a better life
was shaped by the dialectic of broader state-led economic and social shifts
and intra-generational responsibilities, obligations and hopes, cutting
across present and future  temporalities. Sara’s life trajectory of valued,
stable and protected factory work, endowed with citizenship entitlements,
and her investment in her daughter’s education, is an expression of the
emergence of stable and protected forms of employment developed in
the post-1974 Portugal and of a livelihood earner model and project tied
to past forms of deprivation and future aspirations of economic and social
freedom. Sara’s daughter’s current condition of precarity is tied to this
history, composed of various layers, scales and temporalities, whose
meanings will become more evident in the next section.
The Carnation revolution provided ordinary people with the means (e.g.
legal codification of worker’s rights and residual expansion of stable and
protected forms of employment) with which to articulate horizons of
livelihood possibilities, as well as legal instruments with which to claim rights
and entitlements (e.g. health, social security, education). The contra-cyclical
character of a socialist- oriented revolutionary process had to accommodate
emergent forms of labour flexibility in parallel with the expansion of Fordist
and protected forms of employment. This created a tension in the way
people articulated expectations of increasing economic and social freedom
across generations. The expression ‘April is still to be accomplished’
indicates people’s intimate awareness of the unfinished status of a collective
project of economic and social freedom, as expressed in the fulfilment of
aspirations of  material livelihood improvement and greater  social inclusion
and equality. Freedom was gradually replaced by the promise of modernity,
arising from inclusion in the EEC, as the moral and ideological grammar
bridging state projects of accumulation and livelihood projects.
The neoliberal promise of modernity
Portugal’s integration into the EEC in 1986 was politically conveyed as the
realisation of the collective aspirations of modernity and economic progress
that had been nurtured since the revolution. The promise of modernity was
the moral and ideological impetus supporting the mutual legitimation of two
different projects: the gradual consolidation of a neoliberal regime of accumu-
lation and the expansion of a welfare state and social protection structures. The
former mediated the conditions under which historical patterns of labour
devaluation and precarization were progres- sively transferred into an
expanding service sector, whilst the latter addressed an indelible memory of
dispossession, reinforcing people’s longing for a better livelihood,
expressed as an intra- generational investment in middle-class belonging and
inclusion in the emergent modern Portugal.
The neoliberal promise of modernity was realised in a wave of privatisations
of key economic sectors, an emphasis on ‘free market’ rhetoric and a
definitive change in the economy, characterised by the parallel growth of the
service sector and precarious forms of employment. In 1990, the ‘lei- quadro
das privatizações’ (the general law of privatisations) was approved, allowing
for the full privatisation of state assets. This began with the financial sector,
followed by monopolies in energy, telecommunications and infrastructures.
The privatisation spree was facilitated by the tenure of a right-wing
government, which adopted the neoliberal mantra of privatisation as the path
towards modernity. From 1985 to 1995, the Social Democratic Party (PSD)
won two parliamentary majorities. The economic language promoted in  the
two mandates hung on  the idea of ‘structural reforms in institutions,
regulations and the functioning mechanisms of the market’. It promoted the
idea of the ‘free working of market forces and private initiative’, whilst
alluding to the economic and political imperative of alignment with core
countries of the EEC. The new international competition after entering the
EEC, combined with the precarious nature of Portuguese industry, meant that
any increase in capital could only be achieved through the devaluation of
labour, the expansion of precarious employment in the growing service sector
(Rodrigues 1988, p. 228).
The counterpoint of the neoliberal reconfiguration of the economy was
realised through state investment, supported by transfers from the EEC, in
infrastructure, telecommunications and energy. Welfare provision
expanded, benefits expenditure increased, and access to higher education
was extended across social classes14
 
(Hespanha et  al.  2000). Portuguese
‘embedded  neoliberalism’ entailed financial liberalisation, labour
deregulation and banking privatisation in parallel with the expansion and
some cases, reinforcement, of state social protection, which served the
purpose of legitimising the former (Rodrigues and Reis 2012, p. 19).
After integration in the EEC, intra-generational livelihood models and
projects were increasingly shaped by the ‘middle-class effect’ (Estanque
2003), a symbolic referent promoted by state policies, particularly the mass
expansion of higher education. The middle-class effect has concealed
profound class inequalities amongst the population, whilst at the same time
shaping individual class identification and expectations of the future.
Amongst the working class parental generations of today’s young precarious
workers, the middle-class effect encouraged the material investment and
aspirational projection of educational achievement, stable employment and
freedom from want, as representing the progressive realisation of longings for
a better livelihood. Access  to home-ownership,  an expanding market  of
status-laden goods, the use of state welfare services, increasing access to new
leisure outlets, and a sense of being part of the European core, facilitated
14 In 1991 the number of persons holding a higher education degree was 18,671 and by 2010 had 
grown to 78,609. See h  tt  p  ://  www.po  r  da  ta  .pt  / Po  rt  uga  l / 
D  i p  l omados+no+ensino+sup  eri  or+  t o  tal  +e+por+niv  el  +de+fo  r  macao-  219.
consent to an  intra-generational agreement framed by the promise of  status,
inclusion and recognition. Parental generations consented to the
normalisation of the middle-class liveli- hood model because it enabled class
disidentification (Skeggs 1997) against a collective memory of dispossession
and deprivation. The former acted as a force shaping how people articulated
ways of acting upon a field of possibilities and conditions not entirely of their
own making.
Ana’s trajectory illustrates how the neoliberal embedded promise of
modernity intensified the lived contradiction between increasing forms of
labour precarization and growing expectations of security, status and
recognition amongst younger generations. Ana was born in 1978, in a small
village in central Portugal. At that time her father was already retired after
working for more than 30 years as an electrician in the Portuguese national
railway (CP). Her mother worked for decades as a housekeeper in a house
belonging to a family of wealthy landowners of the region. Ana went to
Lisbon at 18 years old to study social work at a private university. In Lisbon,
she worked in a call  centre. In 2003 Ana obtained her degree, whilst still
working part-time as a telemarketer. In 2004 Ana and a work colleague went
to London in search of a better life. She began working part- time in a
restaurant, earning around £600 per month. The money was not enough to pay
the bills, and she got a job in a sales call centre, earning £250 pounds per
week—she mentioned that together with her restaurant salary it was more
than enough to ‘get by’. She worked in the call centre during the day and 4
to5h at the restaurant at night. After a while, out of loneliness and lack of
emotional family support, she decided to return to Portugal.
On her return from London in 2008 she first stayed with her parents. With
her parents’ encouragement she began looking for jobs in social work. Not
wanting to be dependent on her parents she found an evening job as a
waitress. During the day she looked for jobs in newspapers and on  the
internet and wrote applications. She obtained work  with an insurance call
centre, having monthly contracts for the first year, then yearly contracts for
the succeeding 2 years, earning around 700 euros per month. In 2009 she
decided to undertake a part-time apprenticeship in social work in order to
get practice experience, which most jobs required. She remained at the call
centre in the hope of being employed permanently. This investment was to
give her some security and stability and in order to mitigate the ‘frustration’
of both her parents and herself. As she remarked,
My parents feel frustrated because I have a degree and was unable to a job in
my field. Because… They are right… My parents invested a lot in my
course, in economic terms and they think that… They are right… The only
possible good thing I could be doing which would be good for myself would
be to have some professional security in the area for which I qualified. For
which I studied and in which I invested so much. (…) When my parents see
me working in a call centre, earning less than 800 euros, not having a
house of my own… They are right, when they were my age they had three
daughters and were already stable in their jobs.
I interviewed Ana for the first time in 2008, and in 2015 we met various
times formally and informally to talk about her life and work conditions in
the midst of the ongoing austerity. During 2015 I learned that Ana had
given birth to a child in 2011 and was still working in the same call centre.
Rather than having a 1-year contract of employment with the call centre,
Ana was employed as a ‘temp’ by the agency supplying call-centre staff,
masked as a permanent employment contract. That is, her permanent
employment contract with the temping agency will only last whilst the
agency is under contract to the user company. In 2015 Ana told me that
after giving birth in 2011 she and her partner, with the help of both their
parents, decided to contract a mortgage and that the possibility of finding a
job in the social service sector was ever more remote in the horizon.
Throughout  the 1990s  and 2000s,  the emergence of precarity signalled the
continuation of historical patterns of labour devaluation, in the expansion of
precarious employment amongst the educated young. Precarity speaks to
the national failure of expectations of freedom, modernity and progress,
as articulated by the population in the form of an affective and material
expectation of livelihood improvement, across generations and class
mobility. Precarity emerges as the vocabulary of and against which to
articulate the breakdown of social reproduction expectations and the
cumulative forms of dispossession through which the Portuguese state
has undermined people’s means of livelihood whilst capturing them for
accumulation purposes.15
 
The latter became particularly notorious during
the austerity con- juncture when the idea and morality of sacrifice across
generations were ideologically re- worked by the state as the cause and
solution to the national imperative of impoverishment, destitution  and
precarization of large segments of the population.
The austerity sacrifice
The austerity conjuncture in Portugal is shaped by both continuities and
shifts in the way in which precarization is deployed by the state as a core
instrument to accommodate shifting accumulation dynamics, whilst also
incorporating domestic collective aspirations and expec- tations of
economic progress. Similarly to other historical conjunctures, the state
assumed a central role in locally mediating and translating the political and
moral legitimacy of austerity policies. Dissimilarly from previous historical
conjunctures, the right-wing coalition govern- ment who implemented the
structural adjustment programme signed with the ‘Troika’ in 2011,
constituted by a younger generation of politicians with a strong neoliberal
orientation, will use the austerity imperative as an opportunity to
accelerate the neoliberal restructuring of the economy and welfare state
structures. In contrast to its southern European counterparts, the Portuguese
government was determined in proving that austerity worked. The necessity
(and inevitability) of austerity was articulated through a political rhetoric
which conveyed the austerity project as a form of technical fix and moral
generational repair.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Portugal signed a 4-year structural
adjustment pro- gramme with the Troika in May 2011, which resulted in a
78bn-euro bailout, on condition of severe cuts to state expenditure. The
programme’s implementation was shaped by harsh tax increases, spending
15 The ways in which the idiom of precarity in Portugal articulates generational discontinuities as a
failure of social reproduction resonates with findings among post-socialist contexts. Pine (2017) notes
that in Poland, the events of 1989 and the adhesion process to the EU in 2004 have unsettled practices of
kinship obligations among generations and contributed to the re-mapping of work skills and knowledge
transmission. In this process Pine identifies the emergence of ‘lost generations’: Bgenerations written
out of the meta narrative of national political economy because there is no longer a place for them or a
way for them to fulfil the obligations that they had previously undertaken, or generations who choose
a new path which takes them away from the practices of kinship reciprocity, although not
necessarily from the emotions, ideologies or moralities. In both cases what occurs is an inability of
generations, at least in certain classes and contexts, to reproduce: a failure of reproduction (p. 33).
cuts and the reduction of welfare  benefits. Similarly to other countries on
the indebted periphery of the Eurozone, the core of Portuguese policies of
austerity centred on measures of internal devaluation mainly constituted by
wage repression, employment precar- iousness, labour devaluation and
mass unemployment. Mass unemployment was not a bypass effect but a
core tool of the austerity-based economic and moral adjustment, allowing
the government to depress wages to levels paralleling those of the mid-
1980s, but also to manage the crisis through a politics of fear, insecurity
and anxiety, whilst mobilising the rhetoric of ‘social emergency’ as an
‘ideological conductor’ (Hall et al. 1978) to reinforce state legitimacy in
advancing broader shifts in the model of public welfare.
National and international reports have consistently demonstrated the
human and social costs of austerity upon the livelihoods of individuals
and households. In 2012, taking into account the number of persons
considered to be ‘discouraged’ of looking for work, as well as those
underemployed, the number of unemployed reached 22% of the population,
more than 1 million people in a total active population of 5 million; 18.7%
of the adult working population, that is 2 million people, had an average
wage of 409 euros, which according to official data, meant living below the
poverty line; and the levels of mass emigration were parallel to those of the
1960s during the dictatorship16
 
(CES 2013).
During the implementation of the austerity adjustment programme the right-
wing coalition government  elected  on May 2011, led by Pedro Passos
Coelho, publicly announced from the onset its willingness to go ‘beyond the
Troika’ (para além da Troika). The austerity demands tying the
government to the Troika provided the institutional and political
conditions to accelerate the neoliberal rearrangement of social rights and
welfare logics of redistribution, difficult  to accomplish with a democratic
16 It is estimated that between the 1950s and 1974 2 million Portuguese have left the country.
mandate.17
 
In contrast  with other European settings, in Portugal, the
government anti-politics rhetoric enacted with the aim of legitimating harsh
tax increases and welfare cuts was not prominently framed on a tactic of
external blaming. The government claimed for itself authorship of saving
the country from ‘errors of past govern- ments’, in light of the ‘national
condition of social emergency’. Throughout the adjustment programme the
term ‘social emergency’ would be many times repeated by the political
representatives in Portugal and abroad, from the President of the republic to
the President of the European Commission. Over time the willingness to go
beyond the Troika was progres- sively underpinned by a dramatisation of
‘patriotic duty’ and ‘historical mission’ in the country’s economic
recovery trajectory.
Since the institution of austerity, the government disseminated the idea that the
certainty of the immediate suffering inflicted on the population was going to be
rewarded in the future. This was illustrated by variations of the argument
‘Portuguese people are aware that their sacrifices will give fruits in the future’.
The theme of sacrifice was evoked by the government’s agents, mainstream
opinion makers, the economic and banking elites and representatives of
Catholic food charities. The necessity of sacrifice was connected to ideas of
national collective responsibility, the superior morality of enduring
impoverishment and the imperative of shifting economic behaviours and
conducts according to the motto ‘making the same with less’. The austerity
sacrifice, framed in the name of ‘national interest’ appealed to the virtues of
necessity, savings and frugality, resonating with the motto of the ‘natural
tendency of Portuguese people towards piety and sacrifice’ disseminated by
Estado Novo (1933–1974). In particular, the idea of sacrifice was ideologically
effective in securing consent to severe austerity because it appealed to historical
moral idioms of obligation and responsibilities between generations, which
became particularly prominent in the way through  which the metaphors of
17 Moury and Standring  (2017) show that the  Troika’s best pupil’ willingness to  ‘go beyond the
Troika’ allowed the Portuguese government to legitimately pursue an agenda of neoliberal structural
reforms, for which popular consent would be reduced with an electoral mandate. It is suggested that
the right-wing coalition government mobilised specific strategies of depoliticisation, aiming at
reinforcing the national imperative of the proposed reforms, around the main ideas of national
‘credibility’, ‘necessity’ and ‘lack of alternative’.
scarcity and sustainability were politically articulated.
From the outset, the dramatisation of austerity inevitability was
characterised by the government as a condition of ‘national emergency’ in
‘which the state was running the risk of not having money to pay wages
and pensions’. Similarly to other European contexts, the economic and
financial crisis  was ideological re-articulated as a sovereign debt crisis,
caused by citizens who had been living ‘above their possibilities’. If  the
causes of the austerity crisis were transferred from the banks into the
misguided behaviour of individuals and families, so were the
responsibilities. The government’s aims of the ‘need of reforming the
state’ and ‘making the social security system sustainable’ was underlined
by the cross-generational argument that ‘each one should do its part’ and
that ‘sacrifices were going to be equally distributed’. Parents  and sons
were called  upon to become agents  of austerity, as  illustrated in the
reasoning that cuts  in present  pension beneficiaries were imperative to
ensure the sustain- ability of the system in the future. Parents were called
upon to sacrifice themselves in the present, for the well-being of their sons
and daughters in the future. Or, inversely, sons should accept the burden of
less social rights, social protection and stable employment, as a way of
redeeming the irresponsible and unsustainable excesses of their parents.
That is, the disentitlement experienced by young generations was the
counterpoint of their parents (excessive) entitlements achieved in the
past.18
Through austerity, as in other conjunctions of Portuguese capitalist history,
precarization emerges as an integral part of a shifting regime of
accumulation and governance, enabling the most significant transfer of
resources from labour to capital in democratic times (CES 2013). In this
process, the making of a dominant wage regime grounded on the endurance
18 The austerity conjuncture intensifies moral struggles over the social meaning and political
legitimacy of precarity among different social and political actors. Left-wing oppositional political
parties, anti-precarity social movements and trade unions mobilise the precarity terminology as a way
of stressing the radicalisation and acceleration of  the neoliberal reconfiguration of employment and
labour relationships and the general impover- ishment of large sectors of the population. In contrast,
the government increasingly linked the economic imperative of labour flexibility to a moral
grammar of justification grounded on the idea that the excessive protection and privileges of older
workers was preventing younger generations from accessing the labour market. The lack of work,
stability and rights of young precarious workers was rhetorically articulated as the result of the
excessive rights, protections and entitlements of older generations. Precarity was thus re-signified as a
moral form of generational justice.
of impover- ishment was ideologically re-worked and mediated by intra-
generational livelihood models and projects of well-being. Despite (or
maybe because of) the harshness of the austerity carried out in Portugal, in
2014 the country was being praised as the ‘good student of Europe’, and
from 2011 to 2014, no major social conflict was able to change the
systematic impoverishment and dispossession of large segments of the
population—highly unevenly distributed and targeting  the most
impoverished levels  of the population.  The most prominent factor facilitat-
ing popular consent was precisely the historically and morally intra-
generational resonance enabled by the metaphors of scarcity and
sustainability. They spoke directly to the widespread knowledge and
practices accumulated by various generations, in their pursuit of overcoming
material privation and destitution. They spoke directly to a moral grammar
of obligations, responsibilities and interdependencies structuring
relationships and livelihoods, within and between generations. Such is
highlighted by studies which emphasise the articulated role of various
family-based coping strategies in tempering the effects of austerity
(Coelho et al. 2014). Namely, the growth of co-residence of more than one
generation in the same household, the overburden of women in paid and
unpaid forms of work,  the sharing of available income from old age
pensions across generations and the increase of importance given to family
values connected with intra-generational welfare solidarity.
Multiple-generations households functioned as a cushion to the most
extreme effects of austerity policies, but they have also intensified tensions
between generations regarding expecta- tions of autonomy and dependency.
Older generations feel a sense of being drained of their resources at an age
in which they expected that their sons and daughters would help them.
Younger generations, on the other hand, experience the prolonged dependency
upon their parents and grandparents as a form of material and moral failure,
reminding them of their inability to achieve autonomous respectable
adulthood through stable and protected employment (in the production
sphere), and a recognised lifestyle according to their middle-class status
aspirations through home ownership and economic independence (in the
consumption sphere).
Conclusion
In a recent review article on precarity, Clara Han (2018) highlights a
tension pervading the anthropological literature Bbetween asserting a
common condition of ontological precarity and the impulse to describe the
various ways in which vulnerability appears within forms of life^ (p. 332).
Han is emphasising, on the one hand, envisioning the condition of
precarity as a shared human condition grounded on the inherent
interdependent and relational nature of human embodied existence
independent, to a certain extent, of any particular form of life (Butler
2004), and, on the other, precarity as a historically and morally bounded
condition shaped by particular experiential and socially embodied affects
of post-Fordist nostalgia (Allison  2013) and ecological degradation
(Weston 2012).
Building upon this tension, I want to suggest that theorisations of
precarity may be expanded through greater attention at how precarization
operates at different scales (i.e. global, local, relational and affective) which
may not be necessarily antithetical but rather mutually constitutive. The
approach developed in this article argues that analysis of precarization
should be sensitive to  history (i.e. contingent national  pathways of
precarization resulting from state- led projects of accumulation
development) and contingency (i.e. the precariat in its empirical variability
and how it relates to structures of feeling such as class, kin or generation).
This approach has the aim of expanding the integration, in analysis of
precarity and precarization processes, of the material and ideological
constraints determining people’s livelihoods and capabilities, whilst also
attending to the ways in which the former are deeply entangled in
stabilising the moral framework of expectations, obligations and
responsibilities, across kin, class and generation. Doing so might enable us
to understand how normative wage labour regimes operate as instruments
of exploitation, dominance and governance, and how people accommodate
or contest them through informal forms of making a living grounded on
the articulation of various channels and cultural idioms for the provisioning
of livelihood resources and recognition. Ultimately, the approach developed
in this article may help to explain why the precariat has not united, despite
the prophecies of their revolutionary potential in the current capitalist
conjuncture. The aim, therefore, is to contribute to a progressive politics of
precarity, one that does not envision history, context and contingency as
an end-point to future alternative and international alliances, but rather as a
starting point  for a more  comprehensive dialogue on precarity and
precarization, its pre-existing enabling conditions and current forms. The
ways in which the meanings of precarity in contemporary Portugal are tied to
unfulfilled intra-generational projects of middle-class distinction indicate how
precarious class subjectivities emerge through the dialectics of dominant
wage regimes and normative livelihood models, from the ongoing lived
tension between the wage imperative and the imperative to make a living
(Denning 2010). I want to suggest that the potential emancipatory and
political value of the precarity terminology is severely limited and
compromised if it obscures all the differentially constitutive histories and
moralities of the social formations encompassed by the label precariat in
ahistorical fixed typologies. This reduces working people to ‘people without
history’ (Kasmir and Carbonella 2008, 2014). Recovering these differentially
constituted set of histories means not only accounting  for the  individual
variability of precarious livelihoods. By emphasising differentially constituted
(and constitutive) histories of precarization, a better understanding of the
shared commonalities is gained. Variability and comparison matter and
contingency need not lead to separation. Instead, beyond sharing a similar
structural economic position, through comparison an increased awareness of
a common condition and a shared understanding of common struggles,
feelings and values are achieved. The differential outcome of processes of
neoliberalisation operating in distinct geographies should not be neglected
(Peck and Tickell 2002). Neglecting these contingent histories means to
conceal the uneven and contradictory dialectics of labour exploitation that
capitalism entails, as well as the hopes and moral struggles shaping the
livelihoods of ordinary people in and beyond the wage-earning context.
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